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MEDICAID REFORM THROUGH SETTING HEALTH CARE
PRIORITIES
ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The face of American health care has changed since the creation
of the two largest government funded health programs, Medicare and
Medicaid, two decades ago.1 While the change in the structure of the
health care system is hardly attributable to the development of these
programs alone, both have contributed substantially to the creation and
the amelioration of the major structural problems in health care delivery in this county. In addition, whatever positive cultural benefits those
programs have provided, they have carried with them one overwhelming defect. Like a particularly virulent virus, they have infected the

English language with obscure and untreatable words and phrases
which has added to the mystery and impenetrability of the underlying
substantive law. The Medicaid statute has been described as
"[b]yzantine" (by Justice Powell), 2 "a morass of bureaucratic complex* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
Since this article was prepared in the middle of 1990, there have been substantial
developments in the Oregon proposal. The number of condition-treatment pairs (or
ranked services) prioritized by the Oregon Health Services Commission has been reduced to 709. The list of priorities was sent to the legislature on May 1, 1991, and on
June 30, 1991, the Oregon legislature approved a new Medicaid budget that would
fund the top 587 of the 709 ranked services. The legislature drew the line substantially
lower than many critics of the program thought they would, and the covered services
include a great deal of preventive care, including prenatal care and immunization, and
many kinds of intensive and expensive care, including heart and liver transplants under
some circumstances. The plan adopted by the Oregon legislature will increase the Oregon Medicaid budget by almost $100 million, a substantial figure even in these days of
generally escalating Medicaid budgets. The state has now applied for a Medicaid
waiver to allow the plan to go in effect in July of 1992. See Sipes-Metzler, Oregon
Update, 21 Hastings Center Rep (5) 13 (September-October 1991).
1. In 1989 Medicare cost the federal government $96 billion, and Medicaid cost
the state and federal governments $71 billion. This accounts for almost two-thirds of
the total amount spent by government for health care that year, and almost one-fourth
of the total amount expended for health care in this country in 1989. See FURROW,
JOHNSON, JOST & SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW 565-67 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter
HEALTH LAW].

2. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981). This example and the
next four are taken from Nemore & Finberg, Medicaid and the Elderly Poor, REPRESENTING OLDER PERSONS: AN ADVOCATES MANUAL, at 39 (1990).
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ity" (by Chief Justice Burger),' "almost unintelligible to the uninitiated" (by Judge Friendly),' "an aggravated assault on the English language, resistant to attempts to understand it" and a "Serbonian bog".'
While it is the Medicare statute that requires us to say "utilize" when
we mean "use, ' and which has compounded our discomfort by creating the word "utilization," 8 the. Medicaid statute is arguably even
worse. Is it better to be a "Pickle Amendment eligible" 9 or an "optional categorically needy?" 10 Whichever choice is preferable, if we
wish to set health care priorities for that category, we would be engaged in "prioritization." At least this confusion serves one purpose in
this area: the obscure language of the law does adequately reflect the
arcane and complex structure of the substantive law itself. One appropriate title for this paper could be "Prioritizing Healthcare: Is Either of
These Really a Word?"
Alas, of course, both are. This brief paper will describe the way
Oregon proposes to modify its Medicaid program through prioritization
(i.e., setting treatment priorities).1 1 It will then discuss the effect the
proposal will have on those who depend upon Medicaid for health care
and the effect the proposal will have on our national debate over our
health care system. 2 This paper will also list the legal arguments that
are likely to be raised against the Oregon proposal,13 and then review
the more important policy argument against the proposal. 4 Finally,
this paper will suggest that the real problem with the proposed Oregon
system is not that it is unfair to poor people, women, minorities, or
others, but that any priority list that generalizes from condition-treatment pairs necessarily overgeneralizes, that the range of cost-utility ratios for any condition-treatment pair varies so widely that the application of a state formula is bound to fail, and that the nature of an
appropriate doctor-patient relationship requires that the doctor treat a
flesh and blood patient, not some cardboard cutout "average" patient

3. Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 279 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4. Friedman v. Berger, 557 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976).
5. Friedman v. Berger, 409 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
6. Feld v. Berger, 424 F. Supp. 1356, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (Supp. 1991) (The first use of "utilize" in the
Medicaid statute).
8. See, e.g., id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4 (Supp. 1991) for a particularly obscure
use of this new word.
9. Don't like the sound of this? How about living in a "209(b)" state? For a
description of this unusual status which is possible in only 14 states, see HEALTH LAW,
supra note 1,at 568-69.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1991), if that makes it any clearer.
11. See infra notes 36-59 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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with the same condition.'6 The solution to these problems, however, is
not to abandon the setting of treatment priorities. Instead, the solution
is to evaluate conditions and treatments in terms of the more general
goals of medicine, and, then, with much less categorization, to set priorities so that those goals can be best achieved.
II.

MEDICAID

The Medicaid program is a state administered program designed
to provide medical assistance to the indigent. 16 While the programs
vary from state to state, the structure of the programs is relatively similar: when a person eligible as a Medicaid client obtains covered services or goods from an eligible provider, the state reimburses the provider an amount determined through a state statutory or regulatory
process. If the state program is consistent with Title XIX of the Social
Security Act (the Medicaid statute), the federal government reimburses the state government some percentage of its expenditures. The
federal government's reimbursement of the state ranges from 50% to
80% depending upon the financial condition of the state. The richer
the state is, the smaller the federal reimbursement it receives. California and Massachusetts each have a 50% reimbursement, while Mississippi is over 70% reimbursed. This year Oregon receives 62% of its
Medicaid expenditures from the federal government.
Some classes of indigent (the "categorically needy") must be
made eligible for Medicaid for the state to seek'federal reimbursement. 7 These "categorically needy" include those who are blind, disabled, or receive old age assistance under Social Security and who otherwise meet need criteria, as well as those receiving aid to families with
dependent children (AFDC), the basic state welfare program. The
"need" eligibility for the AFDC program is established on a state-bystate basis by each state, with the amount of income that qualifies a
family for state medical assistance often being far below the federal
poverty line.' 8 In addition, states may choose to make other "optionally
categorically needy"'" or "medically needy"2 0 groups of people eligible
15. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
16. For a good general overview of the operation of Medicaid, see HEALTH LAW,
supra note 1, at 565-67. See also 3 Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH)
1400015660, and Medicaid and the Elderly Poor, supra note 2.

17. See 42 CFR §§ 435.1-435.136, 436.1-436.118. See 3 Medicare and Medicaid
Guide (CCH) 14231. For eligibility criteria generally, see HEALTH LAW, supra note
1, at 568-70. See also 3 Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) 11 14231, 14251,
14271.

18.

For example, in 1990 to qualify for AFDC in Oregon a family had to earn

less than 58% of the federal poverty level. Several states had even lower levels of
eligibility.
19. See 3 Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH)
14251.
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for Medicaid benefits. The federal law requires that the various groups
covered by a state Medicaid program be given certain designated kinds
of services.2 1 For example, the Medicaid program must include inpatient hospital and physician services, at least for the "categorically
needy." The state's Medicaid program may, in addition, provide a wide
range of optional services to those who are eligible. Under federal regulations issued pursuant to the statute, it is impermissible for a state to
deny to an eligible person any necessary medical treatment because of
22
that person's medical condition.
Those persons who qualify for Medicaid-the very poor receiving
some Social Security benefits or AFDC-have access to virtually all
medically necessary services. Indigents who do not qualify-single or
married adults without children, whatever their income, and families
with income above the state eligibility limit but below the federal pov,erty line-do not have access to any reimbursed care. Illustrative of
this disparity is the determination by one federal court that an alcoholic cannot be denied a liver transplant under a state Medicaid program,1 and another court that a state Medicaid agency must provide
sex change surgery because it is medically necessary for those Medicaid eligibles who are true transsexuals. 4 Contrarily, the Medicaid ineligible must forgo not only sex conversion therapy and a liver transplant, but also an appendectomy needed for appendicitis or antibiotics
necessary to control an infection.
Of course, states could overcome this conundrum by increasing the
number of Medicaid eligibles. Unfortunately, since its creation in 1965,
Medicaid has grown from a friendly pet of state legislatures into a
voracious budget eating monster. It now usually receives the largest or
second largest state appropriation, depending upon the state's formula
for funding education. 5 In the words of Oregon State Senator
20. Id.
21. The categorically needy must be provided the following required services:
inpatient hospital service (for other than mental disease), outpatient hospital service,
rural health clinic and ambulatory care service, laboratory and x-ray services, physician's services, nurse-midwife service and pediatric and family nurse practitioner services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(10) (1990); 3 Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH)
14511.
22. 42 C.F.R. § 230(c) (1989) states:
The Medicaid agency may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration or scope of a required service . . . to an otherwise eligible recipient
solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness or condition.
23. Allen v. Mansour, 681 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
24. Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Rush v. Parham,
625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980).
25. In Massachusetts, for example, it accounts for $1.8 billion, "far and away"
the largest item in a state budget of $12 billion. Stein, Sacred Cows, Boston Globe,
Aug. 27, 1989, at A-i. For a sense of how long this has been true, see Pear, Many
States Limit Medicaid Programs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1984, at A-1, col. 5.
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Kitzhaber, a physician and the originator of the Oregon Medicaid reform plan, Medicaid is "the Pac-Man of state budgets. ' '2 ' During an
era when state legislators have been busy reading lips, there has been
little interest in increasing the pool of poor people who are eligible to
7
receive state reimbursed medical assistance.1
In addition, there is an underlying presumption that the poor who
are not covered by Medicaid manage to find health care services anyway, even if they are inconvenienced by the form and location of the
services to which they may have access. 8 In fact, this presumption is
probably wrong.2 There islittle reliable evidence that suggests that the
uncovered poor get adequate health care. Emergency rooms are now
obliged to provide emergency care to all who appear at their doors, at
least under some circumstances,3 0 and some communities have limited
alternative health care systems for the indigent."' By and large, though,
there is no reason to believe that these Medicaid ineligible indigents
receive any other form of health care.

III.

THE OREGON BASIC HEALTH SERVICES PROGRAM

Frustrated by this everything-for-eligibles and nothing-for-ineligibles dichotomy, the Oregon state legislature has proposed the Oregon Basic Health Services Program. 2 While the Medicaid reform aspects of the program are only a part of a scheme that would encourage
Oregon employers to provide adequate basic health services to their
employees33 and create an uninsured risk pool for others, 4 it is the
Medicaid reform which is the most significant. The Medicaid reform
26. Knox, Oregon Strips Its Medicaid Benefit Plan, Boston Globe, July 9, 1990,
at Science & Technology, p. 27.
27. See Pear, supra note 25.

28. The source of this presumption is unclear; perhaps it stems from a romantic
notion of the charitable foundations of our current health care system. In any case, it is
a presumption that is the indulgence of the insured. It is most surely not the experience
of those who are presumed to partake of this mysterious source of gratuitous care.
29. Davis and Rowland, Uninsured and Underserved: Inequities in Health Care
in the United States, THE NATION'S HEALTH (3d ed. 1990).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. 1991).

31. Various local and county indigent funds provide very small amounts of gratuitous care in non-emergency circumstances. In addition, some institutions built with
Hill-Burton funds may still be required to provide small bits of uncompensated care. 42
U.S.C. §§ 291-300o (1986). Those remaining Hill-Burton obligations will soon be
fulfilled.
32. The basic program is contained in Oregon's Senate Bill 27 (1989). This bill
became law in 1989.

33. Oregon Senate Bill 935 (1989), providing for affordable insurance plans, tax
credits and other incentives for small employers to provide adequate health insurance
for their employees. This bill became law in 1989.

34. Oregon Senate Bill 534 (1989), providing for guaranteed health insurance at
150% of an average premium. This bill became law in 1989.
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program is designed to provide only the most cost effective medical

treatment (and no other treatment) to all of the poor-a change from
the current system which provides all treatment to those people, like
families receiving AFDC, who are categorized as the most deserving,
and no services to others. Because this rationing plan would violate

some parts of the federal Medicaid statute, Oregon cannot implement
it and continue to receive federal funds unless it gets a program waiver
from the Health Care Financing Administration. 5 This waiver is now
in draft form.
The first challenge for Oregon was to determine who would receive
assistance under a new, broader (even if less comprehensive, in terms of

service) Medicaid system. This was any easy question for the Oregon
legislature which concluded that every person under the federal poverty
line was to be eligible to participate. 6 A more difficult question was the
source of the revenue to pay for this expansion of Medicaid eligibility.
Originally, the intent was to take all of those currently in the Medicaid
program, add to that group all other Oregonians below the federal poverty level, and provide them all of the most cost effective medical services." Ultimately, the most politically powerful forces-the elderly,

for example, and long term care facilities-managed to get themselves

excluded from the revised version program.3 8 The political strength of
the elderly lobby was demonstrated in other states as well. For example, in Colorado an act very similar to the Oregon Basic Health Ser-

vices Act which did not exclude any category of Medicaid recipient

from the priority process was unsuccessful. 3 9 Thus, those who qualify

35. The waiver may be issued under section 115 of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1325(a), if the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines that a
demonstration project will promote the objectives of the Medicaid program. Because
those objectives remain quite obscure (beyond, very generally, providing health care to
the poor), there remains uncertainty about whether the Secretary should grant the
waiver in this case. Of course, independently, there also remains uncertainty about
whether he will. The Secretary has very wide latitude in deciding whether to grant a
waiver. See Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
36. Senate Bill 27, § 1 (1989), codified as OR. REV. STAT. § 414.036 (1989).
37. Senate Bill 27, as originally proposed.
38. Senate Bill 27, § 3 (1989), which exempts:
(1)
Nursing facilities
and home-and-community-based
waivered
services ... ;
(2) Medical assistance to the elderly, the blind, and the disabled or medical
care provided to children [under certain circumstances];
(3) Institutional, home-and-community-based waivered services or Community Mental Health Program care for the mentally retarded or developmentally disabled, for the chronically mentally ill or emotionally disturbed and
for the treatment of alcohol- and drug-dependent persons; and
(4) Services to children who are wards of the Children's Services
Division ....
39. See Knox, supra note 26.

1991]

MEDICAID REFORM THROUGH PRIORITIES

for Medicaid because they receive old age assistance and those who
need long term care (and some others) will continue to get all necessary medical treatment through Medicaid in Oregon. Others, mostly
those who qualify for Medicaid by virtue of their receipt of AFDC, will
receive only the most cost effective treatment. The resources saved by
not reimbursing the least cost effective treatments-and any other resources that might be added by the Oregon state legislature'O-would
go to provide the most cost-benefit effective services to the previously
ineligible indigents in Oregon. While there is little doubt that a more
comprehensive program that applies the treatment priorities to all
Medicaid beneficiaries (or all who seek health care within the state,
under Medicaid or otherwise) would be a better and more fair program, the significant question now is whether the limited Oregon application of prioritized health services is more fair than the current all-ornothing system.
The next challenge for Oregon was to develop a list of treatment
priorities. The Oregon statute created the Health Services Commission
to do this, and this commission set out to create a ranked list of condition-treatment pairs in order of their cost benefit ratio. The idea was to
get the most benefit for the money appropriated for Medicaid purposes.
In order to achieve this end, the Commission had to make several
determinations:
1. The Commission first determined the effectiveness of each treatment for a designated condition; i.e., what was the outcome of the
treatment, and how did this compare to the natural course of the condition without treatment? To make these determinations the Commission
established 54 separate committees based on medical specialties to review the literature and articulate the consequences of treatment (or its
absence) in each case. These committees reviewed 29 possible symptoms and potential functional impairments to determine what the
chance of their occurrence would be with treatment and without treatment, and what the duration of each condition would be.41
40. There is an expectation that the Oregon state legislature will increase its
Medicaid funding by around 10% if it receives a waiver.
41. The members of the committee were given the following written instructions:
This information is being requested to develop the expected outcomes of a
given treatment. It is understood that some outcome data may be subjective
in nature. A disease may be bimodal with significantly different outcomes
occurring dependent on age of onset or vary according to the extent of the
disease at the time of presentation (stage). If this is the case, please use two
or more lines to define the condition. An attachment sheet accompanies this
package to define the major categories to be evaluated. PLEASE THINK
OF THE AVERAGE PATIENT THAT PRESENTS WITH THIS CONDITION, NOT THE EXTREMES....
INSTRUCTIONS
ICD-9 Codes and Diagnosis
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2. The Commission also had to establish the value of each of the
Please list both the ICD-9 code and a brief description. These may be
grouped as much as possible.
CPT-4 and Procedure
Please list both the CPT-4 code used for treatment of this condition
and a brief description. Group procedures that are similar in efficacy
as much as possible. Please be prepared to identify any ancillary service (such as radiology, physical therapy) that may assist this
procedure.
Median Age for This Treatment of the Condition
Please provide a median age for this treatment of the condition. The
cohort code listed on the attachment should be used if specific ages
cannot be identified.
Probability That Treatment for the Given Diagnosis Will Be Applied
Please provide your best estimate in percentages for the incidence of
this treatment for the given condition.
Expected Duration of the Treatment Result
Please indicate the length of time that the treatment result will continue to be effective for the condition. If the beneficial effects persists
for the future lifetime of the patient, indicate "LT".
Outcome Probability
Please provide your best estimation of the percent of the time that
certain outcomes would occur five (5) years hence not given evaluated
treatment and with treatment. The outcome expectations should not
exceed 100% of the population for no treatment and with treatment.
The outcomes are:
1. Death
2. Residual Effects
3. Residual Effects
4. Residual Effects
5. Asymptomatic
The residual effects columns may be used to define health states intermediate to death and the return to prior health. Each column used
must contain a single number designating the major symptom and
may include up to three alpha codes, each one representing an impairment of physical or social activity and mobility. See attachments for
major symptom and physical, social and mobility codes.
Cost
Please give your best estimate of the cost of the condition for the lifetime of the patient without the aforementioned treatment and with
the treatment, if you are able.
OFFICE OF

MEDICAL

ASSISTANCE

PROGRAMS,

OR.

DEPT. OF

HUMAN

RESOURCES,

Waiver Application for Oregon Medicaid Demonstration Project, April 26, 1990 at
Appendix 2F.
The outcomes were to be defined in the following ways:
CODE

CLASSIFICATION

MEDIAN AGE*
(in years)

I
C
A
Y

Infancy
Child
Adolescent
Young

under 1
1 - 10
11 - 18
Adult 19 - 35
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potential outcomes. To determine how significant various outcomes
M
S

Middle-Aged
Senior

*

E
Elderly
Age group at which the condition most frequently occurs.
CODE
MT

MH
PW

PB

SL
SN
CODE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

36 - 55
Adult 56 - 70

over 70

DEFINITIONS
MOBILITY SCALE (MOB)
Did not drive a car, health related; did not ride in a car as usual for
age (younger than 15 yr), health related, and/or did not use public
transportation, health related; or had or would have used more help
than usual for age to use public transportation, health related
In hospital, health related
PHYSICAL ACTIVITY SCALE (PAC)
In wheelchair, moved or controlled movement of wheelchair without
help from someone else; or had trouble or did not try to lift, stoop,
bend over, or use stairs or inclines, health related; and/or limped,
used a cane, crutches, or walker, health related; and/or had any
other physical limitation in -walking, or did not try to walk as far or
as fast as others the same age are able, health related
In bed, chair or couch for most of or all of the day, health related;
or in wheelchair, did not move or control the movement of
wheelchair without help from someone else, health related
SOCIAL ACTIVITY SCALE (SAC)
Limited in major or other role activity, health related, or performed
no major role activity, health related, but did perform self-care
activities
Performed no major role activity, health related, and did not
perform or had more help than usual in performance of one or more
self-care activities, health related
MAJOR SYMPTOM
Loss of consciousness such as seizure (fits), fainting, or coma (out
cold or knocked out)
Burn over large areas of face, body, arms or legs
Pain, bleeding, itching, or discharge (drainage) from sexual organs does not include normal menstrual (monthly) bleeding
Trouble learning, remembering, or thinking clearly
Any combination of one or more hands, feet, arms or legs either
missing, deformed (crooked), paralyzed (unable to move), or broken
- includes wearing artificial limbs or braces
Pain, stiffness, weakness, numbness, or other discomfort in chest,
stomach (including hernia or rupture), side, neck, back, hips, or any
joints or hands, feet, arms, or legs
Pain, burning, bleeding, itching, or- other difficulty with rectum,
bowel movements, or urination (passing water)
Sick or upset stomach, vomiting or loose bowel movement, with or
without fever, chills, or aching all over
General tiredness, weakness, or weight loss
Coughing, wheezing, or shortness of breath, with or without fever,
chills, or aching all over
Spells of feeling upset, being depressed or of crying
Headache, or dizziness, or ringing in ears, or spells of feeling hot, or
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might be to Oregon residents, the Commission conducted a telephone

survey of 1001 people in Oregon. They were asked questions that allowed the Commission to develop a quality of well being (QWB) scale
similar to that developed by Robert Kaplan over a decade ago.' 2 On
this scale the various symptoms and potential functional impairments
that were considered as part of the effectiveness study were evaluated
to determine how much each would detract from the value of "perfect
health" to the average Oregonian. For example, those surveyed indi-

cated that if they were unable to drive a car or use public transportation, but had no other symptoms or limitations, their health status
would be 94.7 % of perfect health. Thus, an outcome which resulted in
the inability of the patient to drive a car or use public transportation
would result in a loss of health of .053. The functional impairment
scores ranged from 94.7 % to 40.3 % (or a weight of -.597) for "in bed

most of day, or in wheelchair not under individual's control." The consequences of various symptoms ranged from -.46 for "has trouble with
the use of drugs and alcohol" to -.08 for "wears glasses or contacts".
Surprisingly coma reduced perfect health by only .117 while trouble
learning and thinking reduced it by .395."3
3. The Commission also determined the cost of each treatment.
Initially, the cost was equated to the amount which the Oregon Medicaid program currently reimburses for the designated treatment.

nervous, or shaky
Burning or itching rash on large areas of face, body, arms, or legs
Trouble talking, such as lisp, stuttering, hoarseness, or being unable
to speak
Pain or discomfort in one or both eyes (such as burning or itching)
or any trouble seeing after correction
Overweight for age and height or skin defect of face, body, arms, or
legs, such as scars, pimples, warts, bruises, or changes in color
Pain in ear, tooth, jaw, throat, lips, tongue; several missing or
crooked permanent teeth - includes wearing bridges or false teeth;
stuffy, runny nose; or any trouble hearing - includes wearing a
hearing aid
Taking medication or staying on a prescribed diet for health
Wore eyeglasses or contact lenses
Asymptomatic problem
Has trouble falling asleep or staying asleep
Has trouble with sexual interest or performance
Is often worried
Has trouble with the use of drugs or alcohol

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Id.
42.

For an updated discussion of the bases of this scale, see Kaplan and Ander-

son, A General Health Policy Model: Update and Application, 23

HEALTH SERVICES

June 1988, at 203, and articles cited there. See also, Kaplan, Anderson,
Wu, Mathews, Kozin and Orenstein, The Quality of Well-Being Scale: Applications in
AIDS, Cystic Fibrosis, and Arthritis, 27 MED. CARE, March Supp. 1989, at 527.
43. The full scale revealed the following:
RESEARCH,
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Once the effectiveness, symptom and functional impairment scores
and costs are established, Oregon can qualify the outcome of each
treatment for each condition and establish a value for the consequences
of that outcome on the well being of the patient. This combination of
the outcomes and their values can then be balanced against the cost of
the treatment to render an index number that can then be compared
with the index number of every other condition-treatment pair. Because
each treatment could have several outcomes, each with its own effect
on a patient's well being, and each lasting a different number of years,

Major
Complaint

Symptom and Functional Impairment Scores and Weights
Oregon
0 to 100 Score

Mobility:
MH (MOBI) Hospital or nursing home
MT (MOB2) Unable to drive a car or use
public transportation

Oregon
Weights

93.7

-.063

94.7

-.053

Physical Activity:
PB (PAC1) In bed most of day, or in
wheelchair not under individual's control
40.3
PW (PAC2) In bed or wheelchair but could
control
60.4
Social Activity:
SN (SACI) Need help eating and using
bathroom
89.2
SL (SAC2) Limited in role activity
93.7
Symptom:
1-Loss of consciousness, coma
88.3
2-Burn
62.2
3-Sex organs: pain, discharge
67.7
4-Trouble learning, thinking
60.5
5-Abnormal extremities
73.0
6-Back, Joints: pain, stiffness
72.7
7-Bladder, rectal: pain
68.9
8-Vomiting, diarrhea
61.8
9-Fatigue, weakness
70.9
10-Cough, wheezing
66.6
1 I-Depression
64.6
12-Headache, dizziness
67.2
13-Rash: burning, itching
68.3
14-Speech problems
80.2
15-Eyes: pain, vision problems
73.4
16-Skin defects; overweight
77.2
17-ENT: dental, pain in ears
76.8
18-Medication, diet
86.2
19-Glasses, contacts
92.0
20-Sleep difficulty
74.1
21-Sexual performance
72.8
22-Worrying
76.4
23-Drugs, alcohol
54.0
Telephone Survey Results for Health Values Telephone Survey (Oregon), 3

-.597
-.396
-.108
-.063
-.117
-.378
-.323
-.395
-.270
-.273
-.311
-.382
-.291
-.334
-.354
-.328
-.317
-. 198
-.266
-.228
-.232
-. 138
-.080
-.259
-.272
-.236
-.460
(1990).
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and because the failure to provide the treatment could also have several
consequences, each with its own effect on the well being of the patient
for a different amount of time, the determination of the cost-utility ratio is a complex procedure. While the formula has changed occasionally, in late 1990 for each condition-treatment pair, the cost-utility ratio was determined by applying the following formula:"
B=

C
5

y* ( I

[p1, * (1 +

1=1

30
2
j=l

with treatment

d,,,w,)] -

[p, * (1 +

30
Z dj = w)])

j=l
without treatment

The first run of the 1694 condition-treatment pairs was completed
in 1990. By way of example, the run presumed that the condition "diabetic coma" when treated by "hospitalization with insulin" would result in a net improved quality of well being of .773, and this improved
quality would have a duration of 40 years. In addition, this treatment
would cost $891.34, giving it a cost-utility ratio of 28.84. The condition
of fractured/decayed tooth, when treated with restorative service,
would only provide a quality of well being increase of .220, and only for
seven years. On the other hand, it could be provided for $45.11, and it
thus yielded virtually the same cost-utility ratio (29.24) as the treatment of diabetic coma by hospitalization and insulin. Both of these had
a much better cost-utility ratio than the treatment of breast cancer
with mastectomy, which was determined to provide a .743 quality of
well being increase for a duration of 20 years, but at an expense of

44.

In this equation,
B, =the net benefit value ratio for the nth condition/treatment pair to be

ranked. This value will be used in determining the actual rankings of health services

from highest (0) to lowest (-infinity).
Y =the years for which the treatment can be expected to benefit the patient with
this condition. This may be the remainder of the patient's lifetime or some shorter
amount of time.
pil=the probability that the ith outcome will occur five years hence with
treatment.
dij=An indicator variable denoting the presence (= 1)or absence (=9) of the
jth health limitation (MOB, PAC or SAC) or chief complaint for the ith outcome
with treatment.
wj =the weight given by Oregonian's to the jth health limitation or chief complaint ranging from 0=no significant effect to -1=death.
P2 =the probability that the ith outcome will occur five years hence without
treatment.
di2 =An indicator variable denoting the presence or absence of the jth health
limitation or chief complaint for the ith outcome without treatment.
c ost with treatment, including all medications and ancillary services as well as
the cost of the primary procedure.
Waiver Application for Oregon Medicaid Demonstration Project, supra note 41, at Appendix 2B.
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$5364.40, rendering a ratio of 360.95. In fact, the top ranked condition-treatment pair was the treatment of bacterial meningitis by antibiotics dispensed at an office visit. Others ranking very high were the

treatment of crooked teeth by space maintainers,' 5 the treatment of infertility by artificial insemination,' 6 the treatment of migraine headache by acupuncture,' 7 and the treatment of appendicitis by appendectomy."8 The bottom of the list included the treatment of high blood
pressure by diet, drugs and exercise,4 9 the treatment of rabies by hospitalization, 50 and the treatment of multiple tooth loss by a partial denture.5 1 The treatment of transvestism by behavior and group therapy
just barely made the top half5 2 of the list while obstetrical care for

pregnancy was not in the top 1000 condition-treatment pairs.53
Of course, the first run of such an innovative program was bound
to have some anomalies. Many of the rankings appear unjustified, and
the Health Services Commission is now reviewing them. In addition,
the Health Services Commission will be able to modify the rankings
through the application of social values. The social values were developed by the 1000 Oregonians who attended 47 community meetings
throughout the state during January, February and March of this year.

The values that were articulated most frequently at these meetings
were prevention of illness and the maintenance of quality of life, while
community compassion, impact on society, the maintenance of length

of life, and personal responsibility were mentioned far less often. 5 '
45. It ranked 19 out of 1694.
46. It ranked 73 out of 1694.
47. It ranked 132 out of 1694.
48. It ranked 396, barely making the top quarter.
49. It ranked 1565 out of 1694.
50. It ranked 1616 out of 1694.
51. It ranked 1671 out of 1694.
52. It ranked 787 out of 1694.
53. It ranked 1040 out of 1694.
54. The Executive Summary of the report of these meetings provides:
This report is a compilation of the values expressed at all of the health decisions community meetings held in Oregon. Some values were expressed
more frequently than others. All are included in this report. What values do
Oregonians want the Health Services Commission to use in guiding the process of prioritizing health care services? The following are values Oregonians indicated should be considered. (The frequency of discussion of each
value is shown in parenthesis).
1. Prevention (very high-all community meetings)
2. Quality of Life (very high-all community meetings)
3. Cost Effectiveness (high-more than 3/ of community meetings)
4. Ability to Function (moderately high- / of community meetings)
5. Equity (moderately high- / of community meetings)
6. Effectiveness of Treatment (medium high-more than
of community meetings)
7. Benefits Many (medium-'A of community meetings)
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When the Commission reorders the rankings based on its correction of
the formula analysis and its social values modification, 55 it will send its
new rankings to actuaries. These actuaries will then determine what
the total Medicaid cost for the proposed eligible population would be
for each condition-treatment pair. The list, with the cost of each item,
will then be forwarded to the state legislature. Finally, the legislature
will determine how far down the list it wishes to go and will draw a line
below the lowest ranked covered service. The legislature, which may
draw the line where it wishes but is not permitted to alter the rankings,
will then appropriate sufficient funds to provide the enlarged pool of
eligibles with all of the services above the line.
Except for those exempted from the new scheme, no Medicaid eligible will receive those services below the line drawn by the legislature.
While there is great disagreement on the propriety of this whole system, there is a consensus on the number of people who will be affected.
In 1990, 144,000 current Medicaid eligibles would have been covered
by the Basic Health Services-Act, while 116,000 people would have
become newly eligible under the waiver. 56 Thus, 260,000 Oregon Medicaid participants would have been subject to the new system of priorities. An additional 52,000 Medicaid recipients would be exempt from
the priority plan. 57 While those exempt constitute only one-third of
those enrolled in the Oregon Medicaid program, they account for a
majority of the current Medicaid expenditures. 8
8. Mental Health and Chemical Dependency (medium-l of community meetings)
9. Personal Choice (medium- of community meetings)
10. Community Compassion (medium low-less than 2 of community
meetings)
11. Impact on Society (medium low-less than 1 of community
meetings)
12. Length of Life (medium low-less than / of community meetings)
13. Personal Responsibility (medium low-less than 1/2 of community
meetings)
Executive Summary, at 5-6.
55. The Health Services Commission completed the new ranking in February of
1991. It rearranged the occasionally surprising computer rankings, in the process reducing the total number of categories from 1694 to 808. Moved up the list were organ
transplants and treatment for pneumonia and tuberculosis. Moved down the list were
terminal AIDS and other untreatable conditions of adults and newborns. The new
highest priority is pneumonia treated by antibiotics; the revised lowest priority is high
tech treatment of anencephaly. See Eagan, Oregon Shakes Up Pioneering Health Plan
for the Poor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1991, at A-12, col 3.
56. Office of Medical Assistance Programs, Oregon Department of Human Resources, The Oregon Basic Health Services Program 11 (June 1990).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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IV.

WHAT THE PROGRAM DOES

The Oregon Basic Health Services Act and its approach to the
delivery of health care has several consequences. Most significantly, it
moves the focus of discussion from who should qualify for health services to what health services ought to be provided. If the community
admits that it must engage in health care rationing, and no one doubts
that we ration health services now, this distinction is an important and
necessary shift. There is little doubt that if this country ever develops a
rational health care system the public debate should center on what
kinds of medical services will be provided to everyone, not on who will
get all imaginable health services and who will get none.
A consequence of this change of viewpoint is the need to analyze
what makes medical care valuable. As long as the focus was only on
who received that care, the discussion could be limited to who was deserving. There was no need to ask just what those recipients might deserve. If all Oregonians-or even some Oregonians on Medicaid-are
entitled to some kinds of health care but not others, there must be some
principled way to determine what kinds of health care should and
should not be available. For example, this society will have to be more
explicit and open in comparing improved quality of life and increased
length of life. While there are those people who object that the Oregon
formula for accomplishing this end is too obscure or too artificially precise to accomplish the task adequately, no one can doubt that Oregon is
directly confronting the questions that the rest of the country will have
to address eventually.
The Basic Health Services Program will also require the legislature to define what constitutes a basic health package that should be
available to everyone. When the Oregon legislature meets to decide
where to draw the line on the ranked list of condition-treatment pairs,
it will be defining that basic health package. While there are those who
fear that the legislature will draw the line at the wrong place, or without regard to a real and comprehensive notion of what constitutes basic
health care, their real quarrel is with what they believe will be the
substance of the Oregon decision, not the Oregon process. Additionally,
the Oregon legislature is in a position to increase Medicaid funding,
something many people expect, if it finds that such an increase is necessary to insure that all necessary basic health services are included in
the package available to Medicaid recipients. In this way the Oregon
process is far different from the experiment in setting priorities that
failed in Alameda County, California, last year. Most health care providers and community organizations refused to participate in the development of a set of priorities for Alameda County because the county
was unable to increase the grossly inadequate Medical funds available
for poor patients. Many thought that participating in an overt rationing
program for the poor was immoral itself, as would be any community
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decision to offer for sacrifice some number of the innocent poor and
sick.59
Finally, the Basic Health Services Program ought to eliminate
that practice of expensive medicine that is not in the patient's interest
but requires that patients be maintained, in the words of Sandra Johnson, as "symbols of the sanctity of life that exist to meet the need of
society." 60 These high cost-no utility cases-the Nancy Cruzans6 ' of
the world-are cases in which the vast majority of Americans would
want to see treatment eliminated, even without regard to any cost-utility analysis. 2 The focus on the what of treatment rather than the who
of treatment provides a principled way to overcome the arguments that
the Nancy Cruzans must be kept alive as symbols of the delivery of
officially adequate health care.
V.

LEGAL ATTACKS ON THE BASIC HEALTH SERVICES PROGRAM

There have been several arguments advanced that the Oregon
Public Health Services Program is illegal. Of course, it is inconsistent
with the regulations issued under the Medicaid statute s and a waiver
of the provisions of that regulation by the Health Care Financing Administration would be necessary for it to become effective. There is currently a debate in Congress about whether the Congress should smooth
the way for that waiver by statute, or whether Congress should block
any such waiver by statute. The legal battle over the propriety of the
waiver will continue in both the Health Care Financing Administration
and in Congress.
If a waiver is granted, there is little doubt. that there will be an
attempt to block the program judicially. Those who wish to block it will
depend upon several civil rights statutes." First, they will argue that it
is facially invalid under the Age Discrimination Act of 1974, which
59.
proposal,
60.
Law, St.

Certainly there may be those who hold this same opinion about the Oregon
even if the Oregon plan includes additional funding for Medicaid.
Quote by Sandra Johnson, Interim Dean of St. Louis University School of
Louis, Missouri.

61. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
62. See, e.g., Annas, Rationing Health Care, Boston Globe, July 22, 1990, at
Focus, A-1.
63. It violates 42 § 230(c), see supra note 22.
64. They may depend on constitutional arguments, too, but without any serious
hope of success. Classification by wealth does not give rise to any increased constitutional scrutiny, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973), and it can hardly be argued that there is no rational basis for the Oregon
proposal. In addition, the Supreme Court has refused to find that health care is a fundamental right; indeed the Court has determined that there is no right at all to have a
state pay for even necessary health care. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
(upholding the Hyde Amendment, which forbids federal reimbursement for abortion
services). See, also, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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prohibits programs from discriminating on the basis of age. 65 Of
course, the Oregon statute requires that all services continue to be provided to those who qualify for old age assistance, and that only others
be subject to the priority limitations. Thus, it will be argued, in violation of the Age Discrimination Act, indigent people over 65 will be
entitled to a whole range of treatments, all determined to be cost-ineffective by the state, that will be denied to younger people who otherwise qualify for Medicaid. It is ironic, those who oppose the Act point
out, that people with the shortest life expectancy will be entitled to the
greatest range of medical treatment. They suggest that the program is
thus irrational as well as illegal. Of course, if this argument were a
sound one, much of the Medicaid program, which describes categorical
need in terms of age (e.g., those receiving old age assistance qualify) is
legally suspect. Because age is a relevant consideration in determining
the propriety of health care, it seems unlikely that this attack on the
scheme will be successful.
The plan may also violate Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.66 While only one in twenty of the non-rationed senior citizens is a racial or ethnic minority, one in five of the rationed indigent
children is. 67 This argument is likely to fail under the principle of
Washington v. Davis68 unless those who oppose the plan can show that
there was a racial animus in the decision to treat the elderly differently
from others who qualify for Medicaid.69 Again, if the Oregon program
fails this test it is likely that any program designed to provide services
to the elderly indigent and not to the young indigent would be found to
be illegal. While such a development might provide a useful check on
legislatures which are heavily lobbied by the elderly, it seems unlikely
that the courts would be willing to apply Titles VI and VII in this way.
The next argument that will be raised by those who oppose the
waiver is that it violates section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
which prohibits discrimination against the handicapped.7 0 Because

65. Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (Supp. 1991). This
and subsequent legal bases for attack on the Oregon plan were suggested by the Children's Defense Fund white papers, "An Analysis of the Impact of the Oregon Medicaid
Reduction Waiver Proposal on Women and Children," May 8, 1990, and "Effect of
Oregon Medicaid Rationing Proposal on Children with Special Health Care Needs,"
June 1990.
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VI, 42, U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (Supp.
1991); Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000f (Supp. 1991).
67. "An Analysis of the Impact of the Oregon Medicaid Reduction Waiver Proposal on Women and Children," supra note 65, at 4.
68. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

69.

Disparate impact is not enough; intent to discriminate is required. See, also

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).

70. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp.
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handicapped people (and handicapped children in particular) have a
need for expensive and continuing treatment for chronic conditions-exactly the kind of condition-treatment pairs that are likely to
be most expensive, and thus likely to be at the bottom of the priority
list-the handicapped are more likely to be denied services that are
now available than are others with acute rather than chronic illness.
Again, the application of the Rehabilitation Act to medical treatment
was severely limited in American Hospital Association v. Bowen (the
"Baby Doe" case), 7 1 where a majority of the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the health status of the patient is a relevant consideration in making health care determinations, and thus section 504
could not prohibit that consideration when physicians were engaged in
making health care determinations. In effect, in Bowen the Supreme
Court held that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not protect
handicapped people's right to treatment that is directed at the handi72
cap itself.
Several other legal bases for opposition to the Oregon Health Services Act are even less convincing. The anti-dumping provisions of COBRA 73 would seem to remain unaffected as long as hospital emergency
rooms otherwise comply with that federal statute since there is nothing
in the Oregon Basic Health Services Plan that would hinder them from
complying. Similarly, those health care institutions still obligated by
Hill-Burton 74 requirements are legally free to meet those requirements
without regard to the Basic Health Services Act, and all institutions
covered by the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 (the "Baby Doe"
statute) 75 could continue to follow the requirements of that Act, even
though they may not be reimbursed by the state for doing so. Of
course, they are not necessarily reimbursed for complying with the requirements of that Act now, either. While the Oregon statute would
release, from tort liability, health care providers who might otherwise
be liable for failing to provide services that were unfunded in the Medicaid scheme, 76 the Oregon statute cannot and does not purport to release those health care institutions from any other obligations they
would have under state law, under federal law, or under the accreditation policies of independent organizations. Finally, the argument that
the whole program constitutes research on human subjects which requires the consent of those human subjects, 77 if taken seriously, would

1991).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. 1991).
42 U.S.C. §§ 291-300o (Supp. 1991).
42 U.S.C. § 5101 (Supp. 1991).
Oregon Senate Bill 27, § 10 (1989).
Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§
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mean that no demonstration Medicaid waiver program could be undertaken without the consent of all of the participants. This would make
innovation impossible and would do away with the very important
waiver programs that provide adequate treatment to HIV positive patients and to other patients who would not otherwise qualify for Medicaid, or could not otherwise qualify for Medicaid, or could not otherwise qualify for treatment in the most appropriate venue.
Ultimately, the Oregon Basic Health Services Act, if implemented
with a Medicaid waiver, is likely to pass legal muster. If there is any
reason to avoid the priority setting process Oregon intends to employ,
that reason is found in policy arguments that have been raised before
the Health Services Commission, the Oregon legislature, or the Health
Care Financing Administration.
VI.

POLICY 'PROBLEMS WITH THE OREGON PLAN

There are several potential social and political costs of instituting a
plan that formally rations by service rather than by eligibility. First, as
the Oregon and Colorado experiences indicate, the political battle over
which groups ought to be included in the priority scheme make the
growing intergenerational battle over health care an explicit and frightening one. While politically powerful elderly groups see no problem in
applying the rationing scheme to children, it is unacceptable to have it
applied to them. The fact that the Oregon program and its Medicaid
waiver application are explicitly opposed by the Children's Defense
Fund and the American Academy of Pediatrics suggests that attempts
to change the current system, which favors the indigent aged over the
indigent young, and which favors indigent children over the indigent
middle-aged, will give rise to a real age-defined battle among segments
of the poor. While our focus may be on the battle between the powerful
aged and advocacy groups for children, the certain losers in such battles are those-like homeless single people, who tend to fall into neither
category-who will remain entirely unrepresented in the fight among
the poor for the nation's health care scraps.
The reason that the American Academy of Pediatrics and the
Children's Defense Fund oppose Oregon's Medicaid Waiver Application is that they conceive the program as essentially unfair to poor
women and poor children who currently qualify for Medicaid and thus
have a vested interest in maintaining their current level of benefits. The
very limited amount Oregon spends on health care for the indigent,
they argue, should not be financed by rationing only poor women and
children. 78 Some opponents go beyond this and suggest that any partic-

46.101-46.124 (1990).
78. These aren't the only objections to the proposal, although they are most substantive. For the rather polemical account of the position of the Children's Defense
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ipation in a priority system amounts to an admission that our health
care system in general, and the Medicaid program in particular, are
zero sum games. The solution, they argue, is putting more money into

health care for the indigent, not taking some necessary services away
from some of them. People who adopt this position argue that it is immoral to participate in such an unfair and inadequate system, and they
suggest that the priority scheme gives Oregon a political way out of
providing adequate health care to all of its citizens.
This principled position is based on a failure to recognize that
states simply are not willing to spend a great deal more on their Medicaid systems; rather, they are looking for ways to cut back on this
kudzu of their state budget programs. Principles will not help the poor
if those who advance them refuse to apply them outside of utopia.
Those who seek health care reform should be obliged to start with the
health care system as we find it, because that is de facto the default

position-that is what we end up with if there is no reform. Health
care in this country surely would be advanced if our medical resources
were redirected so that the poor had greater access to them, but to
expect this to happen through state legislatures' independent actions to
increase their largest budget line item is naive. Advocates of the poor
do them no service when they argue that those categorically favored
people who now quality for Medicaid should continue to get ineffective
costly treatment even though that means that other equally poor peo-

ple, and those slightly less poor but still below the federal poverty line,
are denied inexpensive but effective treatments.
In fact, the argument that the Oregon proposal is unfair because it

Fund, see the publications described in note 65, supra. For a more moderate position,
see the position of the President of the American Academy of Pediatrics, expressed in a
letter to Congressman Waxman on June 7, 1990:
The Oregon proposal, as drafted, is an inequitable, impractical, and inappropriate way to reapportion services and eligibility for the following
reasons:
1.It prioritizes Medicaid care for mothers and children (less than 32 percent of the Medicaid budget) while it does not prioritize health services for
the aged, blind and disabled (greater than 69 percent of the Medicaid
budget).
2. It denies certain services to Medicaid-eligible children, yet the same services may be financed by the state for children of state employees.
3. Oregon may refuse to finance certain services to Medicaid children while
mandating those services in private health insurance.
4. Although state officials claim the draft order of prioritizations will undergo further changes, it is important to note that the most recent draft fails
to include such basic services as immunizations and other preventive services
proved to be cost effective.
5. Because so many procedures have not been evaluated for appropriateness
and efficacy, there is no scientific basis on which to determine their relative
value.
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rations the poor fails to consider why a transfer of resources from the
favored poor is unfair per se. If the politically powerful and well connected take wealth from the poor and disenfranchised for their own
benefit, it makes sense to say that their actions are unfair. That is
hardly the case when the poor with relatively effective public advocates-children, for example-are left with marginally less health care
so that the poor with no advocates-the homeless, for example-can
have access to basic health care.
Of course, some of those who will benefit from the Oregon program-the very poor who do not fit into any Medicaid relevant category-are just as poor as those who now qualify for Medicaid and who
will thus loose some marginally valuable services. Others who will benefit-those who have incomes between the current Oregon eligibility
level and the federal poverty level-are relatively better off than those
who will lose some services, but not in a way that is relevant to the
distribution of state health care resources. These uncovered betweenthe-levels patients have no reasonable possibility of purchasing either
health care or health insurance on the open market; by definition they
do not even have enough income to afford the bare necessities of life.
While their paltry resources may allow them to buy minimal amounts
of clothing and housing (and thus it may make sense to keep AFDC
resources for others with virtually no resources at all), there is no reason whatsoever to treat them as though they had any meaningful access
to health care. In addition, they quite obviously do not have the access
to the political process that might eventually gain them adequate
health care. Those excluded from Medicaid coverage now have proven
themselves politically less powerful-at both the federal and state
levels-than those who have been successful in getting themselves
Medicaid coverage. It would not be unfair to remove marginally valua. ble health care services from those with the political muscle to provide
the most cost-effective services to other indigents with less political
power.
Ultimately, and in part because of the unfairness of the current
Medicaid system, introducing new arbitrariness and unfairness is not
the greatest problem with state experimentation with setting health
care priorities. The real problem resides in the necessary generalization
of the doctor-patient relationship and the bureaucratization of the
health care system that is required by setting condition-treatment priorities. The real problem is that any system which distinguishes all condition-treatment pairs that are appropriate for medical intervention
from those that are not appropriate is necessarily based on the response
of an "average" patient with an "average" case of the designated condition if granted the "average" form of treatment. The essence of practicing good medicine, however, resides in recognizing that any particular patient is not "average," and the patient's condition is not either.
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GENERALIZATION, THE GOALS OF MEDICINE, THE DOCTOR-

PATIENT RELATIONSHIP, AND BUREAUCRATICALLY

DEFINED

TREATMENT PRIORITIES

Ultimately, the most important consequence of the Oregon priority
scheme is not that it will transfer resources from comparatively ineffective treatment from poor women and children to comparatively effective treatment for other poor people, or that it will provide Oregon with
a way out of providing adequate health care for everyone, or that it will
provide a focal point for the intergenerational battle for resources. Ultimately, the greatest risk is that it will bureaucratize medicine by overgeneralizing the nature of the doctor-patient relationship. When a doctor prescribes a coded treatment for a coded condition rather than for a
patient with whom she had developed a relationship, the patient, the
health care system, and the community are all poorer for it. A system
that treats all mastectomies for breast cancer identically may allow
doctors to treat an "average" breast cancer case appropriately, but it
also forces them to treat many (and perhaps most) real cases inappropriately. It requires the cookbook medicine doctors so much fear and
inevitably removes the one-to-one doctor-patient relationship.
No one doubts that the use of antibiotics as a treatment for bacterial meningitis (the top condition-treatment pair in the 1990 Oregon
ranking) is virtually always appropriate. On the other hand, when is
the application of space-maintainers for crooked teeth or artificial insemination for infertility (both in the top five percent in Oregon) really
appropriate? When is the application of a partial denture to multiple
tooth loss or an office visit for a superficial wound (both in the bottom.
five percent in Oregon) appropriate? These are not questions which can
be generalized over a whole society because both79outcomes and values
will vary between persons, even if costs will not.

In addition, sometimes the best medicine is not the obvious conventional medicine. One primary care physician describes his regular
treatment of a severely disabled woman with migraine headaches with
her requested drug-tetracycline.80 There is little doubt that the tetracycline is ineffective in treating her headaches, but her ability to obtain
and use that prescription drug gives her a sense of control that, in fact,
may cure her migraines. Would the intense and sensitive doctor-patient
relationship that led to the prescription of the tetracycline be recognized as appropriate under the Oregon system? Alas, almost certainly
not.
What should a doctor do if he knows that his failure to treat high
blood pressure by diet, drugs and exercise (1565 out of 1694 on the
79.
80.

Of course, costs will vary from case to case also.
W. Wiese, What It Means to Be a Good Doctor, Professional Responsibility

Day presentation (1990).
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Oregon list) will lead to major depression which will require outpatient
therapy (1185 in Oregon)? What if he believes that that major depression, combined with other factors that are a part of the patient's life,
will lead to a heart attack, which is likely to be treatable with anticlotting medications, at least if the patient is under 65 (241 in Oregon)?
Further, the doctor may realize that the heart attack following the depression will lead to the need of artificial insemination to treat the consequential and psychologically based infertility (a very high 73 in the
Oregon scale). Must a sensitive doctor forgo treatment of the high
blood pressure, and then forgo treatment of the major depression, and
offer only treatment for the heart attack (and the infertility, of course)
because the "average" patient would not be driven to depression by his
high blood pressure, and because the "average" patient would not be
driven to a heart attack by a combination of his high blood pressure,
depression, and other factors? The doctor-patient relationship is simply
more complex than 1694 ranked condition-treatment pairs can recognize, and reducing it to such a list will lead to soulless medicine.
Is there some way to set treatment priorities without overgeneralizing? Perhaps doctors should be encouraged to focus on the goals of
medicine in individual cases rather than on the cost-utility ratio of condition-treatment pairs for mythical average patients. Indeed, the Oregon Health Services Commission Alternative Methodology Subcommittee has now suggested that each of the condition-treatment pairs be
categorized into one of twenty-six general categories that more clearly
identify underlying goals of medicine. For example, such categories include "preventive care for nutritional deficiencies in children at risk,"
"treatment of acute life threatening conditions where treatment prevents imminent death with a full recovery and return to previous health
state (e.g., appendectomy, bacterial meningitis)," "treatment of acute
life threatening condition where treatment prevents death but without a
full return to previous health state (e.g., CVA, gunshot to the head),"
"repetitive treatment of non-fatal chronic (with recurrent or continuous
symptoms) conditions with improvement in QWB [quality of well being] with short term benefit (e.g., epilepsy, rheumatoid arthritis)," and
"comfort care for persons with less than one year to live." 81 These cate81. The complete list, released by the Health Services Commission on August
30, 1990, includes, in no particular order:
1. Preventive care for children . . .(e.g., immunizations, well child care)

and treatments of those conditions when the major purpose is to prevent
chronic disability, (e.g., congenital hypothyroidism, treatment of strep
throat).
2. Preventive care for nutritional deficiencies in children at risk (e.g., iron).
3. Preventive dental care for children (e.g., cleaning, fluoride).
4. Preventive are for adults as defined by A, B, and C categories by the
U.S. Taskforce on Prevention.
5. Preventive care for adults as defined by D and E categories by the U.S.
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gories address more directly the functions of health care and the values

we intend to maintain by providing health care. Of course, the same
treatment for the same condition might fit in different categories depending upon the attributes of the patient. Providing nutrition intravenously to a patient with a bowel blockage could fit in several categories,
for example, depending on the nature of the patient. Applying these

categories would allow doctors to treat patients as human beings rather
than merely collections of conditions, and this could preserve the best

attributes of American medicine.
Taskforce on Prevention.
6. Preventive care for nutritional deficiencies in adults at risk.
7. Preventive dental care for adults (e.g., cleaning, fluoride).
8. Vision and Hearing screening for adults.
9. Health education for adults (e.g., smoking cessation, alcohol abuse).
10. Health and safety education (e.g., workplace) for adults.
11. Initial diagnostic screening of presenting problem.
12. Maternity care (e.g., prenatal, natal, and postpartum).
13. Family planning (e.g., sterilization, termination, education and
counseling).
14. Infertility services (e.g., work-up, treatment, and counseling).
15. Treatment of acute life threatening conditions where treatment prevents
imminent death with a full recovery and return to previous health state
(e.g., appendectomy, bacterial meningitis).
16. Treatment of acute life threatening condition where treatment prevents
death but without a full return to previous health state (e.g., CVA, Gunshot
to the head).
17. Treatment of acute nonfatal non self limited conditions with return to
previous health state (e.g., skin diseases).
18. Treatment of acute nonfatal conditions where treatment will improve
QWB without return to prior health state (e.g., burns).
19. Treatment of acute nonfatal self limited conditions where treatment will
expedite return to prior health state (e.g., measles, chicken pox, and viral
warts).
20. Treatment of a fatal chronic condition where with treatment one would
return to previous health state with improvement in life span and QWB
[Quality of Well Being] (e.g., major depression, transplants, diabetes,
schizophrenia).
21. Treatment of a fatal condition with no improvement in life span but
improvement in QWB (e.g., stage IV cancer).
22. Treatment of a fatal condition with improvement in life span with no
improvement in QWB (e.g., life support).
23. One time treatment of nonfatal chronic conditions with improvement in
QWB (hip replacement).
24. Repetitive treatment of nonfatal chronic (with recurrent or continuous
symptoms) conditions with improvement on QWB with short term benefit
(e.g., epilepsy, rheumatoid arthritis).
25. Treatment of nonfatal conditions with minimal' or no improvements in
QWB or life span (e.g., viral pneumonia).
26. Comfort Care for persons with less than 1 year to live.
Minutes, State of Oregon Health Services Commission Meeting, 7 (September 5,
1990).

1991]

MEDICAID REFORM THROUGH PRIORITIES

How would individual cases be categorized in this new scheme,
however? Establishing any bureaucracy and formal process to do the
categorization is likely to lead to the same generalization problems that
create so much difficulty in the current Oregon condition-treatment
rankings. Is there some way to serve the goals of medicine and eliminate generally cost ineffective treatment without applying something
that looks like a social security grid? 82 In fact, the only cost effective
way to do so may be to leave the categorization to doctors, in consultation with their patients in appropriate cases, to be performed on a caseby-case basis. By creating a medical culture that recognizes the limited
resources available for the health of the community, and by creating
formal and informal peer review mechanisms to help physicians make
individual decisions about treatment categories, the community may be
able to accomplish much of what the Oregon program would do without sacrificing primary care medicine and the doctor-patient relationship. Of course, using twenty-six categories (the number suggested in
Oregon) to identify the uses of health care rather than 1694 conditiontreatment pairs, and asking individual physicians to categorize individual patients rather than "average" patients, will sacrifice some apparent accuracy to the uncertainties and idiosyncracies of individual practitioners. Some physicians may move some of their patients from one
necessarily ambiguously defined category to another to assure that patient gets health care, for example. Of course, that could happen under
the Basic Health Services Program, too. In any case, it may be worth
sacrificing some efficiency and accuracy to maintain the authority in
the doctor and the patient.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Oregon, through its Basic Health Services Program, intends to ration health care by service rather than by patient status. That program
is a reasonable and worthwhile improvement on the current arbitrary
system. Most of the legal and policy arguments raised against the Basic
Health Services Program are faulty because they fail to recognize that
some treatments really are more cost effective than others and that
those excluded from the Medicaid system really do not receive even the
most cost effective of those treatments. The Oregon system needs refinement, however, to avoid creating a new arbitrariness, one that arises
out of the presumption that doctors treat conditions rather patients.
There is little doubt that state Medicaid systems and, ultimately,
all other health care systems, will be required to set priorities. These
priorities should be set in terms of the goals of medicine and the treat82. This grid removed discretion from the administrators of the Social Security
disability system by requiring the application of effectively irrebuttable presumptions.
See, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 2 Medical-Vocational Guidelines.
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ments offered to serve those goals rather than in terms of those eligible
for entry into the health care system. The Oregon Basic Health Services Act describes the new health care world, muchachos, and we're in
it. 88 Our endeavor ought to be to help fine tune the system so that it
maintains the utilitarian benefits it was designed to achieve and also
allows medicine to retain the fundamental principles underlying the
doctor-patient relationship.

83.

To paraphrase B. Traven, muchachos.

